Jonathan Haidt is a moral psychologist best known for his work on the moral foundations, identifying the dimensions along which peoples' moral responses vary. The most fundamental moral concerns of human beings include, he says, care or harm, fairness or cheating, liberty or oppression, loyalty or betrayal, authority or subversion, and sanctity or degradation. The neat fact uncovered by his research is that not all people weigh these dimensions of morality seriously, that whilst conservatives bring all these dimensions to bear upon moral deliberation, liberals and libertarians use only the first three. The ''money'' plot is here, showing how much people of different political orientations care about a given moral concern. A significant portion of Haidt's new book, ''The Righteous Mind'' is devoted to explaining these dimensions and findings.
An important concern for Haidt is that liberals and conservatives in contemporary America are increasingly divided (his book is subtitled ''Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion''), and he thinks his moral dimensions help explain why. We simply respond to different moral criteria. We have different ''moral taste-buds'', he says, in an image used repeatedly in the book. It is not just moral disagreement he is interested in however, but moral incomprehension, the fact that we can literally fail to understand what someone on the opposite side might be thinking, or why he isn't a moral monster just because we disagree with him. Here he thinks a significant portion of the blame rests with the liberal side of the divide. One reason is just that the academy and cultural elite is overwhelmingly liberal, so it ignores perspectives from the other side, and participates in group-think. In his last chapter calling for political understanding, he makes much of sociologists like Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Robert Putnam, together with insisting on the value of market libertarianism, and spontaneous economic order. He also points out how science itself has sometimes suffered from political considerations, with a star witness being the sociobiology wars of the 1970s. It is easy to push back here - how is anyone to stock Biology Departments with creationists, and surely conservatives can take more of the ''differing interests'' medicine they want to dish out on gender representation. Nevertheless, I do think he has a point here; at any rate I will not pursue this argument further.†
Haidt's more interesting claim is that while conservatives have access to all the moral criteria (caring, fairness, liberty) that liberals use, liberals lack access to key conservative intuitions, pertaining to loyalty, authority and sanctity. People from ''Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic'' backgrounds, of the sort forming his core audience, are disproportionately likely not to possess the full human moral palate. The effect is of people who lack the taste-receptors for sourness trying to evaluate sweet-and-sour chicken. Haidt says that when asked to predict other peoples' moral responses, conservatives and moderates typically model liberals well, but not vice versa. Surprisingly, Haidt chooses not to include a nice figure or table showing this difference‡, but it seems plausible to to me that (particularly the elite of) the cultural left does more frequently display rampant cluelessness about what motivates the right, than the reverse. Consider for example how many people thought post 2004 that Kansas was being ''duped'' into voting for Bush, as if they couldn't have non-economic, illiberal concerns of their own. Mind you, I suspect being embedded in a matrix of like-thinkers is more relevant here than differences in moral ''palates.''
Haidt also reviews evidence that the human intellect is principally devoted to quick, intuitive thinking, not to rational deliberation. The image he uses is of an elephant, or intuition and emotion, and a rider, or the consciously reasoning mind, where the elephant is roughly speaking in charge. I do not have much to say to this, and will direct the review to the rest of the book, focusing especially on a few particular points. First, the question of ''moral tastes'' and possible ways in which this model fails, or at least loads the die one way. I will have a hopefully constructive criticism of Haidt's decision not to use his framework in addressing some fairly obvious political questions. Then I will get on to ''the evolution stuff.'' This is the bulk of my criticism, so here I quickly summarize it by saying that I don't understand why Haidt needs an underlying framework, much less one based on group selection, that his conclusions for the most part acquire only a Science-y luster from it, and that in any case he's basically just pretending to derive his Moral Foundations Framework from biology (this last is perhaps the most aggressive criticism I make of Haidt.)
A word on ''emotional'' matters is in order. This book is intended to challenge liberals, and so might be irritating in any case if you're a liberal. The irritation is likely to be exacerbated by an unfortunate tendency Haidt has, to blur the boundaries between philosophy and psychology whenever convenient. He spends much of the book implicitly or explicitly suggesting that conservatives are ''right'', while backing away from explicitly arguing for the thing by playing the humble psychologist card - itself a hard sell when your opponents are everywhere called WEIRD. Then after a book full of this, he switches open-faced to saying that the ideas he has presented lead him to think conservatives are actually right much of the time, about happiness, community, welfare, diversity and the like - the last chapter sounds quite a bit like a conversion narrative, actually. One might want to throw the book against a wall when encountering such sleight-of-hand.
The usefulness of Haidt-the-evangelist to your thinking will likely depend on your exposure/openness to his conservative heroes to begin with. People who think conservatives are monsters with no brains and smaller hearts, will learn to think better if they persevere through their heartburn. Those instead who're acquainted with (indeed think fairly well of) some of his great heroes - Hume and Durkheim everywhere, a fair bit of Burke, Hayek and Smith, might find his presentation uncritical, bordering on cheerleading. No doubt this dichotomy is fraught; after all, the first group has a predominantly third person existence! Anyway, while Haidt does bring significant biases to his work, the book is worth reading for liberals who want to have their moral presuppositions inspected and scrutinized. In reading, one does well to watch out for the irritation, consciously deciding case-by-case whether to follow or swallow it. Contra Haidt, an ''emotional'' reading of the book really is likely to be inferior to a ''rational'' one! Despite my overall positive rating (I end up with 3.5/5), the following content will be largely negative. How much this is about valid counterpoints rather than residual irritation, I cannot say. All right. Enough throat-clearing. Let's begin.
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